_The Ethics of Cultural Appropriation_ undertakes a comprehensive and systematic investigation of the moral and aesthetic questions that arise from the practice of cultural appropriation. Explores cultural appropriation in a wide variety of contexts, among them the arts and archaeology, museums, and religion Questions whether cultural appropriation is always morally objectionable Includes research that is equally informed by empirical knowledge and general normative theory Provides a coherent and authoritative perspective gained by the collaboration of philosophers and specialists in the field (...) who all participated in this unique research project. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Part I: Ethnobiology as a Case Example Part II: Philosophical and Ethical Issues: Toward the Creation of ‘Ethical Space’.

According to its author, Engineered Death is not a book about the morality of homicide but about intellectual self-consistency—in particular about the self-consistency of the “liberal” view of homicide. The “liberal” view is defined by Woods as the view that murder is morally wrong because, and only because, it is a violation of rights. He tells us that he is concerned to defend neither liberalism in general nor its notion of individual rights in particular, but only to work out the (...) implications of these assumptions for the problems of abortion, suicide, euthanasia, and senecide. It is only in this sense that Woods' disclaimer about the non-ethical nature of his book can be taken seriously. In every other respect it is a treatise on ethics. It puts forward and defends moral theses that are independent of, and in some cases even contrary to, traditional ethical liberalism. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Appropriation and the Distortion of Cultures Appropriation as Theft Offensive Appropriation of Religion Summary References.

Selected by Choice as one of the outstanding publications for 1991. Are risk debates disputes between those who accept the findings of science and those who do not? Between good and bad science? Or is it possible that opposing assessments of risk, by scientific experts as well as ordinary citizens, reflect and are guided by dominant values held by the assessors? The following analysis of one of these debates supports the latter view. In it we suggest what those dominant values (...) are, how they work within a risk assessment, and some implications of reconceiving risk debates as primarily debates about values. (shrink)